INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon fundamentally changed the way that law enforcement officials operate and address terrorist threats. Immediately after the attacks, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") implemented new procedures that were expected to help prevent and obstruct future acts of terror that appeared to be imminent. 2 In the process, the DOJ vowed to use every available law to combat the threat that this new kind of enemy now posed to individuals within the United States. 3 The exigency to obstruct future attacks led to the reevaluation and broad reinterpretation of existing laws that in some situations has been clearly unconstitutional. Broad interpretations of seemingly narrow statutes were thought necessary in order to allow law enforcement officials to effectively obstruct and prevent future attacks.
The coordination of the attacks and the destruction that it caused shocked the world and alerted many to the reality that fundamentalist and extremist groups were organized and could attack * Bradley A. Parker, B.S., University of Vermont; J.D., City University of New York School of Law. I especially appreciate the insightful comments and support provided by Beena Ahmad.
1 Krulewitch v. U.S., 336 U.S. 440, 458 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 2 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, COUNTERTER-RORISM WHITE PAPER (June 22, 2006) , available at http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/ terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf. 3 Attorney General John Ashcroft, Testimony Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Apr. 13, 2004) ("Had I known a terrorist attack on the United States was imminent in 2001, I would have unloaded our full arsenal of weaponry against it-despite the inevitable criticism. The Justice Department's warriors, our agents, and our prosecutors would have been unleashed. Every tough tactic we have deployed since the attacks would have been deployed before the attacks."), http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing10/ashcroft_statement. pdf.
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The federal terrorism support statutes that ban and criminalize the provision of material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations have been broadly reinterpreted and applied outside of their original scope, which has resulted in violations of First Amendment rights. The Department of Justice's expansive and broad characterization of what constitutes material support has led to misguided prosecutions under the guise of the "War on Terror" that do nothing to actually combat the organizations and individuals that pose a clear and present danger to American lives.
In this Note, I argue that the present prohibition on providing material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations in the form of "expert advice and assistance" is misguided in the larger context of the interminable "War on Terror." The prohibition should be viewed as a violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the terrorism support statutes are not in accord with Scales v. United States 10 and Brandenburg v. Ohio. 11 The broad interpretation of material support prohibitions is a throwback to McCarthyism and essentially criminalizes the provision of advice only when offered to a certain disfavored political organization that has been designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization ("FTO"). Finally, I argue that material support statutes should be narrowly drawn, requiring specific intent to further the illegal aims of an FTO in order to prevent misguided prosecutions against individuals who have no intention to support the illegal aims of a designated FTO. Focusing law enforcement resources on individuals who do not intend to support violent or even illegal acts of an organization ultimately makes us more vulnerable to future attacks. (2006) . 16 Recognizing that the term "terrorist activity" is subjective and generally has been used to describe a broad range of acts and conduct that may not even include violence, I have used the term throughout this paper in reference to the enumerated acts included in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B.
I. A HISTORY OF CRIMINALIZING MATERIAL SUPPORT

A. Pre-September 11, 2001 Federal Material Support Statutes
could still indirectly support terrorist activity as long as they did not specifically intend for their aid or support to do so. 17 The specificintent element was so stringent that § 2339A was not very useful or valuable to federal prosecutors in efforts to eliminate economic support for terrorism.
18
While not extremely valuable to federal prosecutors, § 2339A is constitutional and does not violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has noted that the act of giving money can be considered an act of expression that deserves First Amendment protection. 19 However, the government may ban speech "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 20 An individual prosecuted under § 2339A must know or intend that his or her support will aid in the preparation or carrying out of criminal activity. The speech or material support is directed toward producing violence, which the defendant had the intention to support, and therefore would not be protected by the First Amendment.
21
Following the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995, 22 Congress again attempted to eliminate the financing of terrorist organizations by enacting a more relaxed material support statute that would reach a broader range of individuals than the existing statute. Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 23 which created a second material support statute codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
24 Section 2339B used 17 Chesney, supra note 6, at 13. 18 26 Under § 2339B an individual can be prosecuted for "knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization." 27 The omission of a specific intent requirement in § 2339B broadened its applicability and enhanced the utility of the statute but it was rarely used by federal prosecutors prior to September 11. 28 Interestingly, § 2339B originally contained a licensing scheme or exception for certain types of aid to groups that had been designated as an FTO. 29 Under this licensing scheme individuals or organizations would have been able to seek permission from the Department of the Treasury to provide certain types of aid or support to the designated FTO. 30 The Department of the Treasury could grant a "license only after the person establishes . . . that . . . the funds are intended to be used exclusively for religious, charitable, literary, or educational purposes;" and that all recipients have procedures that "ensure that the funds will be used exclusively for religious, charitable, literary, or educational purposes, and will not be used to offset a transfer of funds to be used in terrorist activity." 31 The proposed scheme would have required the donor and the recipient to keep a record of all transactions that took place and would have required production of those records on the detempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) . 25 Id. § 2339 B(g)(4); Cf. supra note 15 for definition of "material support" under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
26 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (a)(1) (referencing § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act for the definition of a "designated terrorist organization"). 27 Id. § 2339B(a)(1). 28 Chesney, supra note 6, at 19. 29 The proposed licensing scheme provided: (e)(3) The Secretary shall grant a license only after the person establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary that-(A) the funds are intended to be used exclusively for religious, charitable, literary, or educational purposes; and (B) all recipient organizations in any fund-raising chain have effective procedures in place to ensure that the funds (i) will be used exclusively for religious, charitable, literary, or educational purposes, and (ii) will not be used to offset a transfer of funds to be used in terrorist activity. S. 390, 104th Cong. § 301 (1995) (proposing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(e)(3)(A)-(B)); see also Chesney, supra note 6, at 15. 30 Chesney, supra note 6, at 15. 31 S. 390, 104th Cong. § 301 (1995) (proposing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(e)(3)(A)-(B)).
mand of the Secretary of the Treasury. 32 The licensing scheme was dropped following the Oklahoma City bombing and § 2339B acted as a prohibition on all fundraising regardless of the intent of the donor. 33 Prior to September 11, 2001, federal prosecutors rarely prosecuted individuals under either of the then-existing material support statutes. The limited use could be attributed to § 2339A's narrow scope as a result of its specific-intent requirement while § 2339B may have appeared to be too broad for a U.S. Attorney to fervently seek indictments and convictions because of constitutional concerns. The fact that both statutes were Congressional reactions to recent bombings, which had dominated American media because they were large-scale acts of terror, suggests that the statutes were more of a political tool than a tool for federal law enforcement. Regardless of the reason for the limited use of the material support statutes prior to September 11, federal prosecutors after September 11 increasingly began to target a wide range of individuals who had allegedly provided material support to terrorist organizations.
B. Post-September 11 Federal Terrorism-Support Statutes
Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Congress hastily signed 34 the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 35 ("USA PATRIOT Act") into law. The USA PATRIOT Act broadly sought "to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world" and "to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools." 36 The USA PATRIOT Act made a few changes to the existing material support laws. Most importantly, § 805(a)(2)(B) added "expert advice or assistance" to the definition of "material support" in § 2339A, 37 40 the plaintiffs argued that § 805(a)(2)(B) violated First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and association and to petition the government for a redress of grievances because there was no requirement of "specific intent to further the organization's unlawful ends." 41 Next they argued that § 805(a)(2)(B) invites "viewpoint discriminatory targeting of particular groups and their supporters based on their political views" because the Secretary of State has "effectively unreviewable authority to designate foreign organizations as 'terrorist' and [to] prohibit the provision of 'expert advice and assistance'" to that politically disfavored group. 42 Finally, the plaintiffs attacked § 805(a)(2)(B) and its prohibition on "expert advice and assistance" as being "impermissibly vague and substantially overbroad" and as a result § 805(a)(2)(B) fails "to afford adequate notice to individuals of what is prohibited, giving government officials unfettered discretion in enforcement" and causes individuals to refrain from taking part in First Amendment protected activity. 43 The court found that the term "expert advice or assistance" was impermissibly vague 44 but rejected the argument that § 805(a)(2)(B) was overbroad. 51 The first material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, was narrowly drawn and was rarely used. The second material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, was enacted to eliminate the "loophole" that arose under the § 2339A requirement of specific intent; nonetheless federal prosecutors rarely used the statute as a tool to combat terrorism support prior to September 11. Following September 11, the Department of Justice broadly reinterpreted the statutes so that they could be used as a tool to prevent and obstruct future terrorist attacks. The material support statutes were broadly applied beyond their originally intended scope and as a result are now being used in violation of the First Amendment.
II. MATERIAL SUPPORT MISSION CREEP
A. First Amendment Implications
The First Amendment does not provide absolute protection to all types of speech. Unprotected categories of speech relevant to the material support statutes include fighting words, 52 incitement to illegal activity or imminent violence, 53 and true threats or intimidation. 54 It follows quite uncontested that violent conduct and speech that threatens violence may be constitutionally prosecuted. 55 Therefore, individuals who intend to support violent terrorist activity by providing material support as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) can be constitutionally prosecuted and punished under § 2339A because they possess the specific intent required by 48 Id. § 6603(b). 49 Possible conflict with the First Amendment arises in cases where there is no obvious or provable specific intent to further the violent goals of a terrorist organization. The second material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, was specifically created to address these cases but the broad scope of application by federal prosecutors has resulted in a statute that criminalizes First Amendment protected speech and acts as a tool to punish individuals whose conduct cannot be linked to any specific terrorist attack or violent conduct.
In this section I do not challenge the long-standing constitutional jurisprudence that criminalizes speech that threatens violence or that results in violence. I seek to illustrate that the broad interpretation of the material support statutes following September 11 has criminalized speech in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in two different contexts. First, § 2339B infringes on the protected First Amendment right of association by criminalizing material support only when offered to a politically disfavored group. As applied by the government, punishment hinges not on individual intent to further terrorist activity but on the identity of the organization that has received the material support. Individuals are prosecuted and punished because of their tenuous connection to others who have committed illegal acts even though there is no showing of an individualized specific intent to further terrorist activity. Second, § 2339B criminalizes First Amendment protected speech even where the speech is not directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action and is not likely to incite or produce such lawless action. freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." 58 The Supreme Court has recognized that group association is closely related to the constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and assembly. 59 The Court has also acknowledged that "[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." 60 The right of free association applies when an individual assembles as part of a group to partake in protected First Amendment activities. The right to join with other people to advocate for a particular political, cultural, educational, or economic opinion or view is known as the right of "expressive association." 61 The Supreme Court has recognized that "'implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment' is 'a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.' This right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas."
62 Based on the foregoing, individuals have a clearly recognized constitutional right of free association.
Since freedom of association is a constitutionally protected right, an individual cannot be punished for their membership or association with a particular group. Generally, for guilt to be shared, an organization and its members must have a common plan evidenced by a specific intent to commit unlawful acts. 63 In Scales v. United States, the Court stated:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity . . . , that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organiza-58 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 59 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly."). 60 Id. tion engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to be such a relationship. 64 Therefore, in order to punish a defendant in accord with the Constitution, Scales requires that the government establish personal guilt by proving that "a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence.'" 65 While Scales focused on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 66 the Court also determined that the same showing of specific intent was required to comport with the First Amendment. 67 Scales recognized "there would indeed be a real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired" if a "blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims" was deemed to be constitutional. 68 The Court then held that the First Amendment prohibits punishing individuals based solely on their support of a group's legal aims or conduct. 69 Where a group or organization is linked to both illegal and legal activity, the First Amendment requires that the government prove the individual intended to support or further the illegal aims of the group. Without a showing of the specific intent to support or further the illegal acts of the group, an individual may not be punished.
Forgetting Scales: 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
The second material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, was meant to eliminate the perceived narrow utility of the first material support statute 70 and address the criticisms of the "loophole" created by requiring an individual to possess the specific intent to further a group's illegal aims. 71 Critics argued that the specific intent requirement created a "loophole" because individuals could donate to groups that were engaged in both legal and illegal conduct but claimed that they only intended to support the legal aims of the group, such as educational or social aid. 72 Thereby, they would not be subject to the statute and their donations and support would not be subject to any sanctions under the material support law. 73 This "loophole" was the one provision that clearly made the first material support statute constitutional. Section 2339A specifically requires that the individual knew or intended that their support or aid was "to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out" illegal acts.
74 This is in accord with Scales because the individual is only punished where he has the specific intent to further the illegal acts of the group. 75 Also, § 2339A does not rely on the identity of the recipient to determine whether an individual has violated the statute. 76 Section 2339A is constitutional because it simply punishes any material support provided with the intent to further the illegal aims or conduct of any group or organization.
77
One component of the second material support statute that is problematic concerns the addition of "expert advice or assistance" to the definition of "material support." 78 The definition of "material support" previously included only tangible support while the USA PATRIOT Act injected the vague notion of "expert advice or assistance" which has the potential to criminalize speech. 79 Under § 2339A this is not problematic because the requirement of specific intent serves to punish individuals who intend for their support to further illegal activity. 80 Under § 2339B, however, the addition of "expert advice or assistance" opened the door to prosecute individuals who did not intend to further the illegal aims of the group. Their provision of "expert advice or assistance" was only criminalized because their "expert advice or assistance" had been offered to a group that had been designated as a FTO. Therefore, the individual was not required to possess the specific intent of furthering the FTO's illegal aims. This does not comport with Scales as the statute has the potential to punish members of a group who intend to support only the legal aims of that group. Section 2339B ultimately relies on the recipients' identity to 84 and also amended § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 85 to provide the Secretary of State with this authority as a necessary adjunct to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. To designate an organization as an FTO the Secretary of State must find that "(A) the organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist activity . . . ; and (C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States." 86 The Secretary of State can decide at any time that an organization meets the enumerated conditions and may add that organization to the FTO list 87 by informing Congress and publishing notice of the designation in the Federal Register. 88 The designation becomes effective for purposes of the second material support statute 89 upon publication in the Federal Register; however, any designation can "cease to have effect upon an Act of Congress disapproving such designation." 90 Section 2339B clearly requires a knowledge standard, 91 but this does not necessarily mean that an individual specifically intended to support terrorist activity; nevertheless, an individual's provision of "expert advice or assistance" can be punished if the organization has been designated as an FTO. Section 2339B states "[t]o violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization" or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity or terrorism.
92
There is no consideration of what the individual's actual intent was under § 2339B. It is enough that the individual provided "expert advice or assistance" to an organization that he or she knew had been designated as an FTO. Under this standard the individual who provided the "expert advice or assistance" could be criminally liable regardless of what his or her actual intent was at the time. This clearly does not follow Scales's requirement of possessing a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of the organization.
Section 2339B includes no requirement of specific intent to further the illegal aims of an organization as required by Scales. The requirement that "a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization" does not equate a specific intent requirement because the actual intent of the individual is irrelevant. 93 Without requiring specific intent the statute is most likely unconstitutional on its face, at least concerning the provision of "expert advice or assistance," because the individual could be providing expert advice to an FTO on how to end their violent ways. Under § 2339B, criminal liability would be imposed "without regard to the purpose or effect of the actual support provided" or the actual intent of the person providing the support. 94 Ultimately, § 2339B criminalizes individuals for being associated with a politically disfavored group that has been designated as an FTO. Professor David Cole, one of the main opponents of the amended material support statute, has characterized § 2339B as: a classic instance of guilt by association. It imposes liability regardless of an individual's own intentions or purposes, based solely on the individual's connection to others who have committed illegal acts. Moreover, it imposes liability highly selectively. . . . [I]t selectively prohibits material support only to those groups that the Secretary of State in his [or her] discretion chooses to designate.
95
The selectivity and the lack of a specific intent requirement result in a statute that is open to extremely broad interpretations and has 92 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (using "terrorist activity" as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and "terrorism" as defined in section 140(d) (2) The case of Javed Iqbal shows how the lack of a specific intent requirement in § 2339B can lead to the prosecution of individuals who have no intent to further the illegal activity of a group. Iqbal was a Pakistani immigrant who had been in the United States for over 20 years. 97 He operated a small company out of a Brooklyn storefront and from his garage located at his home in Mariners Harbor, Staten Island. 98 Iqbal's business was called HDTV Ltd., and provided satellite television packages and broadcasts to its customers. 99 Iqbal was indicted for providing services that included satellite broadcasts of the television station, Al-Manar. 100 Al-Manar is controlled by the designated FTO Hezbollah. 101 Because AlManar was controlled by an FTO, Iqbal was charged under the second material support statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, for providing material support in the form of "expert advice or assistance and facilities" to an FTO. 102 If convicted of the charges contained in the indictment Iqbal would have faced "a maximum sentence of 110 years imprisonment." 103 Iqbal pled guilty and recently received a sentence of 69 months. 104 quirement that Iqbal intended to further the illegal aims of Hezbollah and under Scales Iqbal should not be held criminally liable. Hezbollah is a Lebanese political and military organization that was formed in the 1980s to drive Israeli forces from Lebanon. Hezbollah also has several seats in the Lebanese parliament. Thus, Hezbollah has both legal and illegal aims since they provide a wide variety of social services such as medical care and education services to various communities throughout Lebanon.
To be punished under Scales, Iqbal must possess the specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the organization. There is no evidence that Iqbal sought to support the illegal aims of Hezbollah by providing customers with access to Al-Manar. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Iqbal sought to support any goals of Hezbollah. The only evidence that the government cites is the exchange of satellite broadcasts for money. 105 Hezbollah did pay Iqbal, but this only proves that a business connection existed between the two, not that Iqbal intended to further the terrorist activity of Hezbollah by providing "expert advice or assistance." Scales demands much more.
First Amendment challenges were raised to the criminal charges but the judge rejected them. Judge Richard M. Berman ruled "that the prosecution was based not on the content of speech but on conduct-allegations that [Iqbal] provided material support to a foreign terrorist group."
106 Judge Berman's focus on the conduct of providing material support when that material support is "expert advice or assistance" is constitutionally troublesome because the speech is being criminalized based on the identity of the recipient. There is no consideration of Iqbal's intent under Judge Berman's ruling. This constitutes guilt by association because it does not follow the Scales requirement of specific intent to further the unlawful acts of an organization.
The lack of a specific intent requirement allows for the prosecution of individuals that did not intend to further the illegal activities of a group. Under § 2339B, an individual like Iqbal can be punished for being associated with a group such as Hezbollah that has both legal and illegal aims. The only protection against the government's broad interpretation of § 2339B following September 11 is to require specific intent.
